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COMPETITION POLICY FOR EAST ASIA 
JOHN O. HALEY∗ 
Considerable effort has gone into the drafting and enactment of 
competition laws throughout East Asia during the past decade. Skeptics 
might say that much of this effort has been wasted. The problem, they 
might argue, is misplaced reliance on inappropriate models. Simply stated, 
the legislative paradigms used for national competition legislation 
throughout the region do not adequately address the basic underpinnings 
of monopoly power and barriers to free and competitive markets in East 
Asia or in most other developing states. Nor, some might add, can these 
models be reasonably transplanted into legal systems that lack the 
institutional and cultural infrastructures necessary for their effective 
implementation. The models themselves originated in the United States 
and Europe over a half-century ago. Indeed the history of antitrust in the 
United States, and the development of competition law in Japan and 
Europe, raise questions whether these models have any applicability to 
China and other parts of East Asia. Enacted under conditions and 
circumstances that simply do not apply to China, or much of East Asia 
today, these models were designed to deal with problems in advanced 
capitalist states in which the influence of private actors in national and 
international markets often seemed to outmatch the role of the state. The 
primary aim of these models was to regulate private actors in order to 
restore and maintain competition. None were concerned with state power 
or the need of the state to create conditions for effective market 
competition. 
Many may agree with this or similar assessments of the applicability of 
American and European competition law models to China and East Asia, 
but still disagree that the effort has been fruitless. The proliferation of 
competition law in East Asia beginning in Japan over a half-century ago 
has had at least one overriding benefit. These legislative efforts have 
stimulated interest in and active concern for effective competition policy 
throughout the region. Such interest has in turn provided in each country 
that has enacted legislation the catalyst for study and research, and ideas 
and expertise on competition policy, regardless of how meaningful or 
effective such legislation ostensibly may appear. As awareness of the 
social and economic gains of effective competition policy grows, expertise 
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will continue to expand and more meaningful approaches are apt to be 
considered and even more effective competition legislation enacted. 
THE PROBLEM 
Statutory models based on United States and European law necessarily 
emphasize proscription of private anticompetitive conduct. Both late 
nineteenth century American and mid-twentieth century European 
legislation were designed to deal with concentrations of economic power 
and its abuse by private actors. As a result, both the prevailing American 
and European models fail to address barriers to competition created or 
maintained by the state. Proponents of an effective competition policy for 
China and other developing states in the region should first recognize that 
the state itself is the problem. Throughout the region, monopoly power and 
other significant impediments to competitive markets have long been 
sourced in state action, not private conduct. The development of 
meaningful competition law in East Asia thus should begin with a 
commitment by the state to create conditions of competition by 
eliminating or at least reducing state-imposed barriers to new entry, state 
practices that attempt to substitute official preferences for competitive 
market-determined outcomes, as well as state-directed and enforced 
private sector restrictions on competition.  
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND POPULIST CONCERNS 
Competition policy developed in the United States, Europe, and Japan 
to address two separate but related problems. The first was economic. 
Monopoly power—defined as the ability of a single actor, or multiple 
actors, taking action in concert to determine price in a relevant economic 
market—results in inefficient allocations of resources with corresponding 
reductions in goods and services that would otherwise have been 
produced. In each country, competition policy also reflected political aims. 
The Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts in the United 
States were also intended to redress imbalances in political influence that 
were perceived to result from concentrations of economic power in a few 
individuals. These perceptions became even more pronounced on the eve 
of war in Europe and the Pacific as the American public accepted a view 
of fascism as an alliance of ultranationalist political leaders, the military, 
and leading industrialists. Competition policy was thus viewed as an 
essential reform to create conditions for democratic governance in both 
Japan and Germany. “Excessive concentrations of economic power,” to 
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quote the language of the occupation statutes,1 were viewed as significant 
barriers to the growth and vitality of democratic institutions.  
Compounding the economic and populist political concerns over the 
private exercise of monopoly power and concentrated wealth were the 
progressive attitudes of intellectual and political elites welcoming the 
expansion of state participation in the economy. In the United States, the 
massive public power projects of the Bonneville Power Administration 
and the Tennessee Valley Authority reflected the prevailing view within 
the progressive community that, in terms of the public welfare, 
government monopoly was as intrinsically benign as private monopoly 
was malignant.2 Thus, at least from an American point of view, effective 
competition policy need only address the evils of private concentrations of 
economic power and private restraints of competition. Although the 
problems of governmentally imposed barriers to entry were occasionally 
noted, for the most part anticompetitive government action and policies 
were ignored in the legislative schemes that developed in the United 
States, Japan, and Europe.  
PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC BARRIERS TO ENTRY  
Competition policy in the industrial world has thus had certain shared 
features. These include the predominant emphasis on private restraints of 
competition. For example, both the German Law against Restraints of 
Competition (GWB)3 and the Japanese Anti-Monopoly Act4 expressly 
exclude public monopoly and only prohibit private anticompetitive acts. In 
notable contrast, however, European Union regulations do subject public 
enterprises to EU competition rules.5  
Nor did the Japanese Anti-Monopoly Act—the first competition law in 
East Asia—deal with the actual barriers to entry and impediments to 
competition that existed in Japanese state controls in the 1930s and 1940s. 
 
 
 1. In Germany the relevant regulations were Law No. 56, 1947 (U.S. zone) Ordinance No. 78, 
Feb. 12, 1947 (British zone) and Ordinance No. 95, 1947 (French zone). Nearly identical regulations 
were enacted by the Japanese Diet ten months later as a statute entitled Kado keizairyoku shūshū haijo 
hō [Elimination of excessive concentrations of economic power law], Law No. 207. 
 2. See, e.g., THURMAN W. ARNOLD, BOTTLENECKS OF BUSINESS 107-15 (1940); MERLE 
FAINSOD & LINCOLN GORDON, GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 346-61 (1941). 
 3. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [Law Against Restraints of Competition], 
v.27.7.1957 (BGB1.I.S1081). 
 4. Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyoki kōsei torihiki no kakuho ni kansuru hōritsu [Law Concerning 
the Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Preservation of Fair Trade] Law No. 54, 1947. 
 5. See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities & Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C340) art. 86(1) 
(1997). 
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As the 1946 State-War Mission on Japanese Combines led by Corwin 
Edwards6 discovered and reported, the critical constraint on competition in 
the Japanese economy during the intermediate prewar period was not 
concentration, cartelization, or collusion, but governmental controls and 
preferences and the ability of zaibatsu firms7 to exclude competitors.8 
They did not, however, discover undue concentration in any industry nor 
did they find any pattern of effective price-fixing or production controls. 
Nineteen firms deemed prima facie to be zaibatsu9 were identified and 
studied. None had significantly high market shares. The “strongholds” of 
zaibatsu power were the various linkages with government that had 
proliferated during the war. Through the control associations, government 
financial policies, and legally imposed restrictions on entry into banking 
and insurance, zaibatsu firms had been able to gain preferential positions 
in nearly all of the industries in which they operated. As indicated in 
occupation studies,10 before 1935 the zaibatsu did not show significant 
growth in either profits or assets. After 1935, however, the gains were 
spectacular.11 With easier access to important officials in economic 
ministries and in dominant positions in the control organizations, big 
business in Japan profited handsomely through subsidies, preferential 
procurement orders, and favorable allocations of capital and raw materials. 
Suppression of competition was the consequence of wartime constraints 
 
 
 6. The Mission on Japanese Combines (also known as the Zaibatsu Mission as well as the 
Edwards Mission) was sent to Japan in January 1946. It was chaired by Corwin Edwards. Robert 
Dawkins, legal adviser and consultant to the Federal Trade Commission, served as its Chief of Staff. 
The members included William B. Dixon, James M. henderson, and Samuel Neel from the Antitrust 
Division of the Justice Department, as well as R. M. Hunter, a legal consultant to the Federal Trade 
Commissioin and Professor of Law at Ohio State University, Raymond Vernon, of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, and Benjamin Wallace, a special advisor to the Tariff Commission. 
 Several versions of the Mission’s classified report appear to exist. See generally Harry First, 
Antitrust in Japan: The Original Intent, 9 PACIFIC RIM L. & POL’Y J. 1 (2000) (citing an undated copy 
in the National Diet Library microfilm collectin of the SCAP archives ostensibly transmitted to the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff on May 28, 1946). Another version, dated March 1946, is available through the 
University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) Library. 
 7. The word zaibatsu—a compound of the Chinese characters for “assets,” “money,” and 
“wealth,” and “clique” and “lineage,” literally “money clique”—was apparently coined by Japanese 
journalists to describe the family-controlled conglomerates that had emerged by the mid 1920s 
(Koreans adopted the same character compound pronounced chaebol for the similar family-controlled 
conglomerates fostered, as noted below, by the South Korean government in the early 1970s). 
 8. First, Original Intent, supra note 6, at 37-38. The March 1946 version of the Edwards 
Mission Report makes the point at 53-55. The report emphasizes zaibatsu ownership of Japan’s 
principal commercial banks as a principal source of their capacity to restrict new entry. 
 9. The nineteen firms were: Mitsui, Mitshubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda, Kawasaki, Nissan, Asano, 
Fuji Industrial, Shibusawa, Furukawa, Okura, Nomura, Riken, Nippon Soda, Nippon Nitrogenous, 
Hitachi, Nichiden, Manchurian Investment, and Oji Paper. First, Original Intent, supra note 6, at 37. 
 10. See, e.g., JEROME B. COHEN, JAPAN’S ECONOMY IN WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION (1949). 
 11. Id. at 508, 509. 
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on access to capital and raw materials, accompanied by growth of close 
personal and institutional ties between the economic ministries (especially 
between the Ministry of Commerce and Industry on one hand, and the 
zaibatsu and other dominant enterprises and control associations on the 
other). By the end of World War II, Japan established what Yukio 
Noguchi12 tellingly refers to as the “1940s system,” a complex network of 
government and distribution controls that functioned through quasi-
autonomous cooperatives, industry associations, and mandatory control 
organizations. 
For East Asia today, perhaps the most relevant external source of ideas 
is the German intellectual experience. The intellectual forebears of 
German competition law—or do-liberals of the Freiburg School—viewed 
competition in constitutional terms.13 They emphasized both the economic 
and social goals of competition policy and did not question its role in 
fostering economic growth and the public welfare. They also understood 
that public monopoly could be as serious an evil as private monopoly.14 
For China and other socialist-market economies in East Asia, the 
problem of anticompetitive state action is obviously even greater than pre- 
or postwar Japan or Germany. For China as a socialist-market economy, 
the state still remains the dominant economic actor. Without an 
extraordinarily strong commitment by the state to the creation of 
conditions for competition, exercises of monopoly power by state actors as 
well as the enforcement of regulatory regimes that enable or promote 
effective exercise of monopoly power seem inevitable. The problem is not 
limited to China or the other socialist states of East Asia; throughout the 
region, large conglomerate firms have emerged. The extent to which these 
conglomerate groups engage in anticompetitive practices is open to 
question. One can argue, for example, that as potential competitors in 
many fields of business overall, they function as important impediments to 
monopoly power by other large, incumbent firms. Be that as it may, in all 
instances these conglomerate firms have received special benefits from the 
state and raise issues of political concern. The development of the Korean 
chaebol,15 for example, was an intentional feature of President Park Chun 
 
 
 12. NOGUCHI YUKIO, 1940 NEN TAISEI: SARABA SENJI KEIZAI [1940 SYSTEM] (1995). 
 13. See generally DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE: 
PROTECTING PROMETHEUS (1998). 
 14. See, e.g., JOHN OWEN HALEY, ANTITRUST IN GERMANY AND JAPAN: THE FIRST FIFTY 
YEARS, 1947-1998 44-46 (2001). 
 15. See supra note 7. 
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Hee’s developmental policies.16 Similar examples of state intervention to 
both aid and protect private economic interests, which have serious 
political implications and at least potential anticompetitive effects, can be 
cited in nearly every country in the region. As in Japan, state action has 
seemed necessary to restrain what otherwise appear to be very healthy 
conditions of firm rivalry.  
Absent state intervention there is little, if any, evidence of effective 
restraints of competition in East Asian markets. Most private enterprises 
are small or medium-sized and operate in fiercely competitive markets. 
Except for Japanese firms and the Korean chaebol, few large-scale 
enterprises exist in the region. Most of these are mutually competing 
conglomerate groups. Moreover, all enterprises in the region, with the 
exception of Japanese firms, are family-controlled. Even the largest, such 
as the Korean chaebol, are family-controlled. As in the case of the prewar 
zaibatsu in Japan, family-owned operations tend to be even more 
competitive. The most common forms of anticompetitive conduct thus 
appear to be exclusionary practices, which rarely succeed without 
government support, rather than concerted anticompetitive action.  
For many governments in the region, the problem has been too much, 
rather than too little, firm rivalry. Thus, in attempting to promote 
economic growth, governments have tried to emulate Japan’s industrial 
policies designed in the 1950s to reduce “excessive competition” and 
promote the creation of internationally competitive firms. 
Many government officials in the region have thus considered vigorous 
competition policy to be antithetical to economic growth and 
development. Fortunately, protectionist barriers to investment and trade 
have steadily declined. The sort of investment and trade policies once 
prevalent in Japan and throughout the region have become less common. 
New entry by both foreign firms, as well as newly established enterprises, 
has become a regional characteristic as the national economies in the 
region have grown. Indeed, East Asia, not the United States or Europe, has 
become the best laboratory to test the proposition that competition leads to 
development. 
COMPETITION POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT 
The historical context within which competition law developed first in 
the United States and Canada, and then in Japan and Europe, did not 
 
 
 16. See, e.g., LEE Y. YEON-HO, THE STATE, SOCIETY AND BIG BUSINESS IN SOUTH KOREA 
(1997). 
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require much consideration as to the relationship between competition law 
and development. The question as to whether a vigorous competition 
policy inhibits or retards economic growth was not a major concern within 
the developed economies in which competition laws were first enacted. 
Although it can be argued that because exercises of monopoly power 
result in misallocation of resources, with corresponding reduction of the 
production of goods and services, it then follows that monopoly power and 
its exercise damage the economy and, at least in theory, restrain economic 
growth. On the other hand, the historical record in the United States and 
Europe offers very little support either for, or for that matter against, the 
theory. There was intense debate in Germany over the relationship 
between economic growth and competition, with more enduring echoes in 
Japan.17 In fact, competition policy in both Germany and Japan 
commenced with vigorous debate within the allied camp over this issue. 
Proponents of a vigorous competition policy, expressed in terms of the 
need to eliminate excessive concentrations of economic power and cartels, 
faced opposition from those who feared that these policies would 
significantly retard postwar economic recovery. In both countries, 
deconcentration efforts stalled and either the effective enforcement (Japan) 
or the enactment of competition legislation (Germany) was postponed 
until economic recovery and high rates of economic growth had been 
achieved. In addition, in both countries, opponents of vigorous 
competition law enforcement expressed concern over the benefits of 
economies of scale and the frequent need for enterprises to cooperate to 
eliminate over-capacity.  
Moreover, the perceived evils of monopoly power and restraints of 
competition have been viewed largely as the ills of advanced industrial 
states. Until recently, few advocated the need for any competition 
legislation for less industrialized states. Consequently, the proponents of 
strong competition policies find it difficult to single out a case in which 
the effective implementation of competition legislation preceded economic 
development. Whether competition policies either inhibited or aided 
economic recovery and growth in either Japan or Germany remains 
contested. As a result, were we to rely on the American and European 
experience, we would be left in the rather discomforting position of having 
to rely largely on theory, rather than empirical data, to test the basic 
proposition of whether competition policy is indeed compatible with 
development.  
 
 
 17. See HALEY, supra note 14, at 24-63. 
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Fortunately, the rapid economic growth of China and other parts of 
East Asia during the past two decades enables us to reexamine the role of 
competitive markets and development. Rapid movements of capital in 
response to new investment opportunities and the expansion of trade and 
new entrants in a multitude of fields, suggests very healthy conditions of 
competition in the private sector. None of this is necessarily new. We 
perhaps need to be reminded that unlike merchant guilds in Europe, those 
of nineteenth century China were organized on the basis of common 
regional identity rather than a common trade. Thus by definition, the 
Chinese trade groups fostered competition by enabling and encouraging 
new entry. One suspects that similar relationships and affiliations 
throughout the Chinese diaspora continue to operate in ways that make the 
private acquisition and exercise of monopoly power quite difficult. In 
conclusion, the East Asian experience is most likely to demonstrate that 
economic growth and development is best served by competition policies 
that restrain state intervention and allow market forces to operate freely.  
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